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Introduction
Land disputes are considered both key sources 
and perpetuating factors of conflict in the eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
Over the years, scholars and practitioners have 
identified a number of critical land-related factors 
contributing to violence and conflict. These 
include a considerable diversity of forms of land 
governance that are fostered by: the existence of 
overlapping legal frameworks and weaknesses 
in statutory land law; increased competition 
over land, including among elites and between 
autochthonous and migrant communities, 
sometimes resulting from large-scale displacement; 
and the poor performance of the administration 
and justice system in the settlement of land 
disputes. The causes for land conflicts in the 
eastern Congo are multiple. The character of these 
conflicts is also diverse, as are the types and levels 
of violence associated with them. It is essential to 
recognize these differences if adequate solutions to 
this source of ongoing tensions are to be found.
This briefing argues that many land-related 
disputes are not only about land but also an 
expression of the effects of the Congo’s governance 
crisis. The options people have to settle their 
disputes in a peaceful, formal and durable manner 
are limited, not least due the state-led justice 
system’s weak performance, which is experienced 
as corrupt, slow, biased or barely accessible. This 
explains why disputants resort to a multitude 
These drawings show the same area with its land plots—the left in 1980, the right in 2005—in the village of Mumosho in Walungu, South Kivu. 
They illustrate increased land competition—and the decreasing size of land plots—partly as a result of demographic pressure. The pictures were 
drawn by participants of a focus group discussion in Mumosho in December 2005.
Key points 
• Current interventions in land conflicts are 
focused on conflict management rather than 
conflict resolution.
•  Land conflicts are part of a wider governance 
problem and need political rather than 
technical approaches.
•  Conflicts over land are related to wider 
conflict dynamics, which are the result of an 
interplay between struggles for power and 
resources, identity narratives and territorial 
claims. 
•  There is a need for better donor 
coordination and more coherent land 
governance interventions, which should be 
integrated into larger state-building efforts.
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of alternative conflict resolution, mediation and 
arbitration mechanisms, involving a wide range of 
state and non-state actors and structures, some of 
which have been introduced with the support of 
external actors. While in some case these various 
mechanisms provide an alternative to conflicting 
parties, they also lead to what can be described 
as a context of legal pluralism. This context does 
not necessarily lead to a better resolution of land-
related disputes. A number of factors, including 
accessibility, existing allegiances and assumed 
outcomes, tend to guide people in their choices 
of how to mediate land conflicts. These factors 
explain why some disputants continue to rely 
on formal justice institutions and others solicit 
mediation by customary chiefs, civil society or even 
armed groups. 
The long-term impact of these various mechanisms 
on land disputes should not be over-estimated. To 
resolve the Congo’s land-related conflicts, genuine 
land governance reform is needed. Expectations 
of such reform should be realistic. At present, 
however, there is limited political will. Moreover, 
successful land reform is primarily conditioned by 
a more capable and effective governance context 
than is currently the case in the Congo. Reforms 
should focus on the rights and livelihoods of small 
farmers and take into account local realities. What 
is needed in one context is not necessarily helpful 
in another. Finally, as  other examples from outside 
the Congo show, land reform processes take a long 
time and thus need long-term investment. 
Three categories of land disputes
The most visible land-related conflicts in the 
eastern Congo, and which have contributed to 
large-scale violence, are those that have pitted 
ethnic communities against each other. Land, 
identity and conflict are often directly connected, 
with competition for land undermining ethnic 
cohabitation and leading to large-scale violence. 
These inter-community conflicts, however, are 
not the most dominant land-related disputes in 
the eastern Congo. Other forms of land-related 
conflict are much more widespread, including 
community-level conflicts between farmers 
and large-scale concessionaires, between rural 
communities and mining companies, between 
pastoralists and farmers, and between national 
parks and surrounding populations. While 
generally accompanied by low levels of violence, 
the grievances related to such conflicts often have 
an indirect impact on security and stability at the 
local level. The most frequent forms of land-related 
conflict are those that happen at the interpersonal 
and intra-familial level. These relate to disputes 
over plot boundaries, inheritance, widows’ rights 
to land, the validity of contracts, and illegal 
acquisition and occupation. These disputes have 
become part of daily realities both in rural and 
urban areas. In many cases, such disputes remain 
unresolved or only partially resolved. 
Individual land disputes 
In the eastern Congo, land disputes between 
individual farmers are widespread, with multiple 
options available to settle these disputes. 
Besides customary authorities (traditionally the 
key actors in land dispute resolution between 
individual farmers with customary titles but as 
a result of recent laws do no longer have the 
formal capacity to provide justice) and the formal, 
but malfunctioning, justice system, a variety of 
alternative options have been introduced by local 
and national actors. Although these mechanisms 
and structures have facilitated farmers’ search 
for solutions, the diversity of resolution channels 
has also caused confusion and affected the 
predictability and sustainability of outcomes.
The prevalence of land conflicts between individual 
farmers is reflected by the sheer number of 
such cases heard before the Congolese courts. A 
survey conducted in 2010 reveals that in the city 
of Butembo (North Kivu), an estimated 85 per 
cent of cases before the TriPaix (Tribunal de Paix—
Peace Tribunal); the lowest level of courts in the 
Congo) are land related.1 This survey also indicates 
that given the partiality of the judiciary and the 
ambiguity of land legislation, judgments decided 
by the formal justice system do not guarantee that 
conflicts are resolved. Moreover, given the weak 
presence and peculiar workings of state services 
in the Congo, which are often heavily influenced 
by patronage, the execution of judgments on 
the ground remains a considerable challenge. In 
Kitchanga (North Kivu), for example, cases have 
been reported in which a judgment was rendered 
in favour of the plaintive but the police were 
complicit in hindering its execution.2 This is not a 
unique case. In many places, the security services 
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have become deeply entrenched in a local political 
economy of arrest, intimidation and extortion, 
further limiting access to fair trials and effective 
means of conflict resolution.3 
The current state of the Congo’s justice sector—its 
inaccessibility and its reputation of being corrupt, 
expensive or unpredictable—has given way to the 
development of a plethora of alternative conflict 
resolution mechanisms and practices. These 
involve a wide range of state and non-state actors 
and structures that engage with mediation and 
arbitration in land conflicts. In conflict-affected 
areas, armed groups often play a key role and 
have become heavily involved in the resolution 
of land conflicts. In Bunyakiri (South Kivu), for 
example, different Raia Mutomboki factions try to 
assert their right to mediate in conflicts between 
individuals, which is an integral part of the strategy 
of this armed group to impose and consolidate 
its authority4. In contrast to state services, Raia 
Mutomboki factions render justice in cheap, 
fast and easily accessible ways, but with little 
transparency; and, in most cases, this justice is 
often only partial because armed groups can easily 
be mobilized to further anyone’s own cause.5
People also still rely on customary authorities, who 
continue to be key actors in the mediation of land 
disputes, even though they no longer have the legal 
authority to adjudicate, a role has been transferred 
to the TriPaix.6 Chiefs, who used to be the legally 
recognized custodians of communally owned land, 
still partly base their authority on their power to 
distribute land, which reflects the ambiguous legal 
framework surrounding land in the Congo. 
Farmers also increasingly refer their cases to 
other actors and structures, including church 
associations, civil society groups and even business 
associations. At present, such actors are involved 
in the settlement of all sorts of disputes, including 
individual-level land conflicts. They also deal with 
far more cases than the formal justice structures 
do.
Similar mediation and sometimes arbitration 
mechanisms at the community level are piloted 
by the Congolese state, or set up by international 
agencies and local NGOs. Examples include 
the governmental comités locaux permanents de 
conciliation (CLPCs, permanent local reconciliation 
committees) in North Kivu or the NGO-backed 
cadre de dialogue et mediation (CDMs, dialogue and 
mediation frameworks) in the two Kivu provinces. 
As is the case with customary arbitration, these 
structures have the advantage of being free. They 
are also often faster in reaching a solution than 
existing mechanisms. Some of these structures are 
particularly effective in dealing with smaller land 
conflicts and have been shown to improve women’s 
access to land;7 others, however, have questionable 
levels of effectiveness.8
Despite their advantages, these mediation efforts 
have a number of downsides. In most cases, the 
means to enforce decisions are virtually non-
existent, which undermines the durability of 
mediation and arbitration outcomes. Some of the 
new structures are not well embedded in local 
society, especially when they are satellites of civil 
society organizations established at the provincial 
level or introduced by international agencies. As 
experts on land-related conflicts conclude, ‘This 
tutelary system means that these structures are 
widely perceived by the population as belonging 
to the organisation that initiated the structure 
rather than to the community itself.’9 At the same 
time, these initiatives tend to depend heavily on 
external financing, in most cases for a limited 
period of time, both of which factors limits their 
sustainability. Yet, the most problematic aspect 
of these mediation and arbitration structures 
and mechanisms is the multitude of approaches 
they take, with only cursory attempts to promote 
coherence or coordination. Furthermore, many 
try to attract disputants and manipulate disputes 
from which they believe they can profit. The 
end result is that even though the threshold to 
engage with these mechanisms is usually much 
lower for small farmers than is the case for formal 
justice, the outcomes of these dispute resolution 
and arbitration efforts tend to become negotiable 
and unpredictable. This limits the chances that 
disputants will find sustainable settlements or 
resolutions for their conflicts. 
Politicized and militarized community-level land 
conflicts
Despite their downsides, the mediation 
mechanisms described often have a positive effect 
on disputes between individual farmers. They are, 
however, ill-suited to address conflicts with stakes 
that transcend the local level, such as land disputes 
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entailing political or identity-based dynamics and 
involving powerful political, economic or military 
actors. 
These larger conflicts must be seen within the 
wider context of patronage politics, state decline 
and protracted conflict in the DRC. Under 
President Mobutu Sese Seko (1965–1997), land 
was integrated into patronage networks. This 
explains why land gained increasing political value 
outside of the customary realm. In rural areas, the 
latter tended to control most of the land outside 
the plantations that were introduced during 
colonialism. In return for political loyalty, political 
and economic elites were offered access to large 
swathes of land in rural areas—often in complicity 
with customary authorities, who saw in this new 
economic opportunities. This was to the detriment 
of peasants, who lost their customary land rights 
to a new class of large-scale landowners.10 The 
result was a dramatic decline in the surface of 
arable land available for small-scale agriculture, 
the effects of which were particularly dramatic 
in demographically dense areas such as Walungu 
(South Kivu), Lubero and Masisi (North Kivu). 
A similar tendency for land grabbing became 
pronounced during and after the Congo Wars 
(1996-1997; 1998-2003). In particular, during the 
rebellion of the Rassemblement congolais pour la 
démocratie (RCD, Congolese Rally for Democracy), 
from 1998 to 2003 and immediately afterwards, 
large plots of land were redistributed to a new class 
of political-military leaders, further circumscribing 
ordinary people’s access to land.11 Land, in other 
words, was gradually transformed into a resource 
of war, becoming a new source of speculation and 
rent-seeking activities. 
The direct involvement of influential political-
military leaders in land-grabbing dynamics, make 
these more complex land conflicts more difficult to 
mediate or arbitrate. They also result in dramatic 
consequences for small farmers who depend on 
these lands for their survival, and others, such 
as former land labourers, who do not have land 
titles and can only access land via labour contracts. 
Around Kitchanga, for example, labourers from 
former plantations have been forcefully driven 
off the land they had been living and farming 
on for decades by a new class of owners (former 
RCD officials and other influential members of 
society), who mainly acquired this land during the 
transition (2003–2006). Thousands of these former 
plantation labourers and their families now live in 
camps in the immediate vicinity of the plantations. 
While they sometimes have access to the land they 
formerly cultivated (as the new concession-owners 
rent it out), no durable settlement has been found 
yet and tensions continue to simmer below the 
surface.12 
Such heavily politicized -- and sometimes 
militarized -- contexts are widespread in the 
eastern Congo and cause increased pressures on 
remaining arable spaces, particularly where land 
is scarce. The dramatic effects for small farmers 
also point to the direct entanglement of land-
grabbing dynamics with the wider problem of 
unequal land distribution in the eastern Congo. 
Farmers often lack the power to claim their 
rights and are consequently forced to develop 
alternative livelihood strategies. This explains, for 
instance, why limited access to land, in addition 
to insecurity and the lack of economic incentives 
in rural areas, is a major driver of migration to 
urban centres. Another option is to seek arable 
lands located within protected areas, such as 
the Virunga and Kahuzi–Biega national parks, 
which in turn is provoking conflicts between park 
administrations and farming communities.13 The 
end result of these dynamics is that particularly 
in war-affected and densely populated rural areas, 
a large class of landless farmers has developed 
over time. Even though in most cases the growing 
marginalization of farming communities does not 
lead to large-scale violent conflict, the grievances 
of individual members of these communities can 
be easily mobilized, which indirectly contributes to 
instability. 
Violent inter-community conflicts
In other cases, land competition has been a direct 
source of violence. This type of land-related 
dispute impacts on inter-ethnic cohabitation and 
contributes to larger conflict dynamics. Land 
competition, however, in some cases is a direct 
source of large-scale violence, inspiring armed 
mobilisation, affecting inter-ethnic cohabitation 
and contributing to larger conflict processes. At 
the core of these dynamics is the close connection 
between the search for power and resources, 
identity and territorial claims, which has been 
fostered by historical processes of state building. 
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Since colonial rule and the further territorialization 
of space on the basis of ethnicity, land is primarily 
governed by specific communities with separate 
and recognized authority structures in clearly 
defined territories, thereby reinforcing the links 
between the right to rule, territory and identity.14 
Land as a material basis for survival, as a result, 
has become a key resource of larger identity-
based power dynamics. Long-term processes of 
politicization of ethnic identity as part of political 
contest help to explain why intensified land 
competition has often turned into an easy source of 
ethnic discourse and (violent) mobilization. 
The dramatic and long-term impact of such inter-
community struggles is illustrated by the case of 
Kalehe (South Kivu). Here, tensions are mainly the 
result of the expected return of Tutsi communities 
to their lands on Kalehe’s Hauts Plateaux (High 
Plateaux) mountain range. These communities left 
the region in 1994 as a result of attacks from Hutu 
armed groups that were related to spill-over effects 
of the Rwandan genocide.15 Prior to their departure, 
Tutsi communities made arrangements about their 
concessions, either selling the land or leaving it 
to custodians or guardians. At present, however, 
much of this land is occupied by Hutu farmers, 
who fear the loss of their livelihood options in 
case the original —Tutsi—landowners return. In 
this case land disputes have revived long-standing 
animosities and contribute to the enduring 
presence of armed groups.16 While community 
leaders use these armed groups to ensure and 
protect their access to land, the persistence of 
these groups is also connected to land grabbing by 
politico-economic elites, which further reduces the 
livelihood options of Hutu farmers.17
In other areas of the eastern Congo, such as 
Masisi, Lubero and the Ruzizi Plains, land-related 
inter-community struggles are often framed in the 
language of autochthony (or indigenousness). In 
these struggles, those claiming to have arrived in 
a particular area first or to have originated there 
are pitted against those defined as newcomers or 
foreigners.18 The recent migration of Hutu farmers 
from Lubero to southern Ituri is a good illustration. 
Local inhabitants claiming to be autochthones 
consider the arrival of Hutu farmers in Ituri 
an invasion, fearing that it is driven by deeper 
economic and political motives, namely to take 
their land and acquire local power. These examples 
illustrate how local competition over land (and 
other resources) has become closely connected to 
and translated into identity rights and discourses, 
and why ethnicity has been transformed into such 
a powerful mobilization tool.
Policy Considerations
Land in the eastern Congo is at once a source 
of power and identity, a condition for survival 
and a driver of (violent) conflict. In a context 
of structural connections between identity and 
territory, a long history of the use of land as a 
patronage resource and as a political commodity, 
and new land-grabbing strategies by political-
military elites, struggles over land have gradually 
intensified. While in most cases these struggles 
remain limited to the individual level, elsewhere 
they affect entire communities and have become 
key drivers for violence.
The major issue when understanding and dealing 
with land disputes is the unequal distribution 
of and access to land. At present, large swathes 
of what is often the most fertile land are in the 
hands of a small elite. In many cases, this land is 
also underused. At the same time, small farmers 
and other impoverished people who live in the 
eastern Congo lack the necessary land and power 
to sustain themselves. Aside from artisanal 
mining, other livelihood sources are virtually non-
existent in rural areas. Both at the national and 
provincial levels, plans for more efficient land use 
in the context of agricultural reform do exist—for 
example, proposing the retrocession of underused 
land—but so far they have not been implemented.19 
Yet, even if land were to be more equally 
redistributed, the issue of demographic pressure 
would remain. This is especially the case in multi-
ethnic areas, where it is a contributing factor to 
intense land struggles. Land governance, therefore, 
should be more inclusive, based on coherent plans 
for rural development and take into account local 
contexts.
Such an approach is not just a technical and 
judicial matter. Above all, it is a highly political 
one, with those in power often having interests 
that are opposed to those of small farmers and 
other impoverished groups. Even though the 
legal framework theoretically provides for the 
more equal distribution of land, land remains a 
highly valued political resource. The implication 
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of political and military elites in land grabbing 
reduces the chances for equal land distribution: 
Addressing land issues directly challenges 
their interests and power. Unfortunately, many 
of the mechanisms and structures to address 
land conflicts that have been introduced by 
donor initiatives are ill-suited to deal with this 
politicization; instead, such donor-led initiatives 
are mostly effective for settling disputes between 
individual farmers.20 Failing to deal with the fact 
that land remains a highly valued political and, 
therefore, contested resource, means that other 
strategies will only be remedial and provide no 
long-term solution to the problems encountered by 
a large part of the population. Campaigns aimed at 
creating political will are therefore indispensable 
for genuine reform of land governance in the DRC. 
Past advocacy campaigns have proven that civil 
society can have an impact on policymaking. This 
is exemplified in the revision of the Loi Agricole 
(Agricultural Law) in 2011, when civil society 
groups from different parts of the country managed 
to exert some influence on the drafting of the 
revised law.21 Although this was a promising first 
step, the Commission national de la réforme foncière 
(CONAREF, Congolese Land Reform Commission) 
that was formed in the wake of redrafting the 
Agricultural Law in 2013 and is responsible for a 
general reform of Congolese land laws in line with 
the roadmap created during the 2012 Atelier sur la 
réforme foncière (Workshop on Land Reform) has so 
far achieved little substantial progress. The biggest 
constraints seem to be the lack of support from 
high-level political actors and a disconnect between 
the technical level and political decision-makers.22
Nevertheless, in line with the steps already taken, 
establishing inclusive advocacy frameworks at the 
provincial and national levels in order to influence 
law reform and policy makers might have a positive 
effect on the current deadlock. It is paramount 
that these advocacy efforts are supported by those 
at the grassroots level and that interventions take 
local realities into account. Congolese civil society 
organizations point to the risk of uncritically 
introducing best practices from abroad and leaning 
too much on the experiences of international 
partners.23 Moreover, what is good for one part of 
the country is not necessarily a priority for other 
parts of the DRC. Given the varying local contexts, 
a standardized top-down approach is unlikely to 
be able to address the structural causes of land 
conflicts. This could even be counterproductive. 
Policies should target different solutions for 
different geographical zones while simultaneously 
operating within a larger framework. 
In the absence of structural responses to land 
governance challenges, the reality is largely 
one of conflict management instead of conflict 
resolution. While existing mediation efforts 
need to be supported, they also need to be 
made more effective and credible. This can be 
achieved by better grounding mediation efforts 
in local understandings of land tenure systems 
and state law, and by receiving more support 
from local and higher-level authorities. More 
coordination is also needed between donors and 
development organizations in order to avoid 
unnecessary duplication and subsequent confusion. 
Furthermore, to make mediation and arbitration 
more durable, legitimate structures involved in 
mediation and the decisions that are made as a 
result of mediation processes could be recognized 
by (local) state authorities in order to make them 
(more) enforceable. Such measures might allow 
efforts that primarily address individual-level 
conflicts to address larger-scale land disputes. 
Alongside the need to ensure the durability and 
application of mediation and arbitration outcomes, 
caution with regard to an exhaustive formalization 
of land titles is also necessary. Experience 
elsewhere has shown that such regularization 
frequently lead to the transfer of wealth to political 
and economic elites, who are often based in urban 
areas.24 Formal land titles or documents pertaining 
to land tenure are not necessarily seen as valid, 
hence introducing them must be accompanied by 
efforts to strengthen their legitimacy. At the same 
time, in reinforcing the value of documentation, 
interventions should be wary not to undermine or 
weaken other non-documented local arrangements 
that are effective.25 In the context of the 
formalization processes, an escalation of conflicts 
and elite capture of the process—even at the local 
level—should be avoided. 
Lastly, in order to safeguard the effectiveness of 
conflict mediation and resolution efforts, it is 
critically important that the structures involved 
in these processes do not compete with others. 
This is especially the case if these other structures 
are provided for in law. A more coherent and 
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collaborative approach between and among 
different state and legitimate non-state judicial and 
extra-judicial structures is paramount. 
All these measures can potentially reduce 
land-related tensions and conflict. Yet, their 
implementation and success can only be achieved 
by a responsible and functioning state. The current 
land governance challenges in the eastern Congo, 
and the country as a whole, are a consequence 
of a generalized governance crisis. Any effort 
to facilitate much-needed land reform should, 
therefore, also address the larger political and 
governance issues preventing it. To move from 
conflict management to conflict resolution, a 
political approach should be developed that goes 
beyond a search for technical solutions and embeds 
land reform in wider policies of rural development. 
Such an approach requires the implication of high-
level political and economic actors across the board 
and the necessary political will from all actors who 
are involved in land reform.
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2014.
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